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CASE NOTE
WATERSHED MANAGEMENT: A COMPARISON
BETWEEN EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN UNION
ANTHONY PERKO
Across the globe, the allocation and use of water, as either an economic
resource or a human right, are marked by inefficiency and unwise governance.
By 2025, water withdrawals are predicted to increase by fifty percent in
developing countries and eighteen percent in developed countries.' In
response to these projections, different groups have proposed plans to create
new legal systems of governance. Integrated Water Resource Management
("IWRM") is the most common of such strategies. IWRM takes into account
variant goals, including equitable distribution, social policy, and environmental
concerns.' However, some policymakers do not accept all IWRM principles,
while others reject IWRM entirely. It is too soon to tell the political and social
result of this failure to adapt, yet it seems unwise to continue with the current
unworkable frameworks of water distribution and administration.
This Comment examines current water law frameworks, focusing on the
challenges they face in a rapidly modernizing world. It also describes alternatives to the status quo and efforts to implement certain alternatives into law,
comparing efforts in the United States to those of the European Union. Part I
briefly explains why most nations' current legal frameworks will be illequipped to face future challenges. Part II outlines the history and goals of
IWRM. Part III compares the European Union's and the United States' attempts to implement IWRM, focusing on the European Union's accomplishments and the United States' failures. Part IV provides possible explanations
for the differences of achievement in implementing IWRM in the two regions.
It also examines whether efforts to implement IWRM in the United States in
the future might meet with more success.

1. See, e.g., RUSSELL ATHERTON ET AL., U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK: ENVIRONMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT (GEO-4) 115-56 (Peter Ashton

available
2007),
ed.,
GEO-4 Report Full-en.pdf.
2.

at

http://www.unep.org/geo/GEO4/report/

ANIL AGARWAL ET AL., GLOBAL WATER P'SHIP, TAc BACKGROUND PAPER NO. 4 at 9

http://wwyw.gwp.org/Global/GWP-CACENAFiles/en/pdf/
at
available
(2000),
tec04.pdf [hereinafter Global WaterP'hil.
166

Issue 1I

CA SE NO TE

167

I. IMPRACTICABILITY OF CURRENT WATER GOVERNANCE
MODELS
Given current rates of population growth in the developed world, water
resources are in increasingly short supply.' The intensifying demand is taxing
the finite amount of fresh water available for human consumption.' Unlike in
the past, when legal systems were able to reasonably manage water apportionment and to come to equitable solutions for interested parties, the future requires these legal systems to adapt to meet the needs of growing populations.
Current administrative and regulatory systems will not be able to keep up
with these future stresses on water supplies." Irrigated agriculture makes up
sixty-nine percent of water withdrawals worldwide, but comprises ninety-three
percent of all consumptive water use, meaning water that is not returned to the
stream after use and thus unavailable to downstream users.' The explosion of
global population, particularly in developing nations, will require agriculture to
feed more people and to use more water in decades to come.' Irrigative uses
of water will create further tension between farmers and future megalopolises,
which will also require water for municipal purposes.' Uninhibited urban
sprawl and unregulated use of pesticides and other contaminants will cause
greater pollution of groundwater and streams, resulting in destruction of plant
and animal ecosystems.' For example, a study of the effect of urban growth
south of Washington, D.C. found that new development caused increased
sediment, as well as mercury, zinc, and lead in the city's water resources." This
growth also compounded the water shortage problem by decreasing the availability of groundwater."
There are numerous reasons why current water governance structures are
ill-suited to deal with future water issues. The most significant obstacle to efficiency and fairness in water management is the fact that water has unique
characteristics that makes it difficult to regulate across borders and jurisdictional lines. Specifically, because "most water resource problems are trans-
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boundary in nature (intermunicipal, interstate, or international)," 3 any dispute
that arises concerning water usage potentially implicates diverse governing bodies and regulatory schemes." Governing water resources implicates several
pertinent regulatory issues, including administrative jurisdiction, hydrological
features, and environmental management concerns, but various political entities handle each differently."' Additionally, scientists and policymakers understand the hydrological connection between surface and groundwater better
today than when policymakers created the current political boundaries and
legal frameworks." The misalignment between political divisions and watershed boundaries creates uncertainty and, at times, contentious challenges." For
example, many allocation negotiations within the Colorado River Basin reflect
the interests of the seven Colorado River Basin states, rather than recognizing
the Basin as a unified hydrological system."
Governments with high levels of resource regulation, such as the United
States and the European Union, administer water resources in exceedingly
complex ways. Within these systems, water management decisions often implicate the regulatory bodies of other fields, such as land use."' This forces any
decision concerning a proposed water transfer to involve other considerations
of associated social priorities." For example, if a municipality proposes to build
a hydroelectric dam in Colorado, it must obtain a preliminary permit from the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC").' However, this permit
only satisfies FERC's requirements, and the municipality will likely need permits from other governing bodies." For instance, courts may consider water
leaving the dam a "discharge" such that the state or interstate water pollution
control agency must certify the discharge to comply with Section 401 of the
Clean Water Act." The United States Army Corps of Engineers may also subject the dam to conditions imposed by efficiency studies." For other matters
13. William Coldfarb, Watershed Management: Slogan or Soluion?, 483 Bos. COLL.
ENvriL. AFF. L. REV. 484, 484 (1994).
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22. Karl Kumli, Attorney, Dietze & Davis, P.C., Address at the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law (Apr. 16, 2012).
23. Compare Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 171-76 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(changes in water quality caused by the operation of a dam, such as changes in dissolved oxygen
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that might and often do arise, the municipality may need to consult with the
Bureau of Reclamation, the US Forest Service, the Bureau of Laund Management, the Colorado Water Control Board, the Water Quality Control Commission, Native American tribes, and the State Historic Preservation Officer.'
In Colorado, the municipality will have to also obtain and adjudicate their
water rights to ensure their rights are enforceable."'
Because water matters implicate such a variety of government regulations
and third-party interests, it is clear that water management can become very
complicated very quickly. As demonstrated above, the division of water administration into many different entities causes much of this complexity. The proposals discussed below represent attempts by individuals and groups to simplify the process in order to facilitate the supervision of water resources.

II. INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A
ROADMAP
In recent years, scholars and lawmakers have dedicated time and energy to
solving problems caused by the complexities of water management. Approaching IWRM as unified policy (as opposed to situation-specific conflict resolutions) is the exception rather than the rule." Nevertheless, entities have formed
certain broad principles that seem to conform to IWATRM."
In 1992, experts in water management, including engineers and legal authorities from various countries (though notably not lawmakers or governmental representatives), met at the International Conference on Water and the
Environment ("Conference") in Dublin to create a unified theory of water
management.2 9 Taking into account several factors, such as the increasing scarcity of water, the varied social stakes involved, and long-term solutions, the
Conference developed "a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems."' The Conference
formulated the four "Dublin Principles," which represent the basic tenets of
IWRM:'
I. Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life,
development and the environment;
II. Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policyinakers at all levels;
III. Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water; and
25.
27.

Kumli, svpla note 22.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-304 (2012).
ELLI LOUKA, WATER LAw & POLICY: GOVERNANCE WrrHOUT FRONTIERS 24 (2008).

28.
29.

Id.
Li

26.

30. GLOBAL WATER P'SHIP, supia note 2, at 22.
PATRICK MORIARTY ET AL., INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT:
31.
THEMATIC OVERVIEW PAPER 4 (2004) ("IIWRM'sl conceptual backbone is provided by a set of
four core principles, agreed upon by the Dublin Ministerial Conference.").
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IV. Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be
recognized as an economic good."
Under the Conference's design, IWRM encourages water governance according to watershed or basin boundaries, not artificial political or administrative divisions." This is in contrast to many nations' current legal structures in
which the laws governing a river's administration vary as it flows through multiple jurisdictions." For example, the Missouri River divides Nebraska and
Iowa.' However, the two states' laws have very little in common with regard to
the water's legal status: Nebraska's Constitution enshrines the doctrine of prior
appropriation, while Iowa utilizes riparian water law." Thus, when the states
work together on a water project, like the Lewis and Clarke Regional Water
System, they must take into account the differing legal structures, even though
all parties reside in the Missouri Basin." IWRM, by contrast, provides that
waters of a flowing stream (as well as its hydrologically connected groundwater)
should be managed along their geographic course, regardless of whether they
cut across extant political boundaries." Because "existing administrative divisions and regulatory conditions might discourage the lintegrated] management
of water," watershed management helps eliminate jurisdictional difficulties
between authorities who would not otherwise work together." This also applies
on the international level, where different countries may work together for the
goal of integrated watershed management, regardless of national boundaries."
Political theorists Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks identified two governmental foundations of political control." Under their theory, administrative
units are characterized as either "Type I" or "Type II" government structures."
Type I government structures are constituency-based, multifunction entities,
such as cities and states." This is the current system in the United States, where
governing authorities within a specific geographic unit handle all administrative
and regulatory functions in that area." Type II government structures are de32.
33.

GLOBAL WATER P'SHIP, supra note 2, at 13-14.
ID.AT 24-26.

34.

See Christine A. Klein, The ConstitutionalMythology of Western Water Law, 14 VA.
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259
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37. See Kundel Farms v. Vir-o Farms, Inc. 467 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
38. See LEwis & CLARK REGIONAL WATER SYSTEM, http://www.lcrws.org/index.php (last
visited Nov. 14, 2012).
39. GLOBAL WATER P'SHIP, supranote 2, at 47.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 48-49.

42.

Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unravelingthe CentralState, but How? Types of Multi-

Level Governance,97 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 233, 233-43 (2003).
43. EDELLA SCHLAGER & WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, EMBRACING WATERSHED POLITICS 21

(2008).
44. Id.
45. Hooghe & Marks, supra note 42, at 233 (detailing how the organization of public transit
in the San Francisco Bay Area is divided between seven different municipalities; this is in con-
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fined by their function, such that their boundaries encompass as many constituencies as necessary to regulate the subject matter over which they hold control, rather than being confined to a single geographic area." IWRM envisions
water management bodies as Type II government structures." These bodies
would regulate all water-related functions within a certain geographic area,
regardless of what state or other jurisdiction may share its borders.'
Establishing a Type II entity to govern a watershed has the advantage of
simplifying problems that arise from disparate agencies and jurisdictions." It
can also lead to fairer allocation and more efficient use of water resources than
under Type I government structures." For example, the respective Type I
systems in Texas and Oklahoma allow two landowners, one in Texas and one
in Oklahoma, to follow their respective laws, yet still create an unjust result. In
Texas, the common law cujus doctrine" ties mineral rights and the right to use
groundwater to landownership." For instance, under this doctrine, a Texan
farmer could pump groundwater connected to a stream without limit so long
as the farmer owned the land above the groundwater." Given the "fugitive"
nature of groundwater, such pumping could lower the water table.' In turn,
this may render groundwater inaccessible to a farmer across the border in Oklahoma, who must apply for well permits limiting the farmer to a certain
amount of water per year." Alternatively, if the states regulated groundwater on
a river basin level, the same laws would apply to both fanrers, avoiding a potentially unjust result.
In contrast, Colorado organizes its water administration into seven water
divisions according to the state's the seven major river basins.' Within each
division, a water court hears all disputes within that basin." Therefore, if the
two farmers in the example above lived in the same basin in Colorado, the
water court for that basin would adjudicate their respective rights, and they

trast to a Type-II structure that would cut across jurisdictional lines to provide the single service
of public transportation for the entire area).
46. Schlager & Bloinquist, supra note 43.
47.
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48.
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50.

See id. at 47-50.
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51.
" Cujus estsolun, ejus est usque ad coclun et adiferof; this Latin phrase translates as
"To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths." See Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs of Cnty. of Park v. Park Cnty. Sportsmen's Ranch, L.L.C. 45 P.3d 693, 700-01
(2002).
52. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 76-80 (Tex. 1999)
(affirming the cuyus doctrine, while noting that groundwater regulation was being considered by
the legislature).

53.

Id.

54.
See DANIEL L. BRENDLE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE
ALTERNATIVES TO LOWER THE HIGH WATER TABLE OF ST. CHARLES MESA, PUEBLO

COUNTY, COLORADO 8-10 (2002), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/wri/wri014190/pdf/wrir014190.pdf.
55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, S 1020.2, 1020.7 (2012).
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would receive equal treatment regarding who should receive well permits."
However, the Colorado water divisions cannot be considered true Type II
entities under Hooghe and Marks' theory. For example, Colorado's water
courts may only hear water matters that statutes delineate." In addition, water
matters concerning pollution discharges and dam construction still involve
federal oversight in addition to the water courts' jurisdiction.' Furthermore,
the water divisions, though aligned along river basins in the spirit of IWRM,
have no authority outside Colorado's borders, thus leaving parts of some river
basins under the jurisdiction of other states."' Nevertheless, the Colorado water
divisions provide an illustration of a nascent Type II water administration
structure within the United States, because river basins to some extent define
the water divisions' authority and the divisions have control over many water
matters within their bounds.
Admittedly, the concept of basin-wide management does not solve every
problem related to water use. In many states, especially in the West, transbasin
water diversions and other complexities create difficulties in deciding which
body possesses authority over a dispute's subject matter." Even if existing Type
I government units agreed to use watersheds as the key administrative unit,
they must still decide at what scale to define each watershed." As a matter of
geologic fact, most rivers are tributaries of other rivers." For instance, administration could be based only along Cherry Creek that runs through Denver, or
it could be absorbed into a larger South Platte River district.' Similarly, states
sharing a river with Colorado may desire to base administration along the larger Missouri River Basin to better address their downstream needs." Presumably, the difficulty in deciding the scale of water administration will put some
localized interests into conflict with larger regional interests, depending on the
priorities of the various parties involved. This discord could frustrate the pur58. Provided that the farmers' groundwater is hydrologically connected in the same river
basin (and thus the same water division) as in the manner discussed in the Texas-Oklahoma
example. The situation becomes more complicated for groundwater that does not align with
river basins, which is a matter beyond the scope of this example.
59. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-203(1) (2012).

60.

See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.

§ 797(e)

(2012).

61.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-201 (2012) (the jurisdiction of the water courts is expressly
limited to "lands in the state of Colorado").

62. See Barbara Cosens, Resolving Conflict mnNon-Ideal, Complex Systems: Solutions for
the Law-Science Breakdowmi m Enironmental and Natual Resources law, 48 NAT. RES. J.
257, 259-65 (2008) (discussing "the complexity of the intersection between human and natural
systems in legal disputes involving natural resources").
63. Schlager & Blomquist, supra note 43, at 24.
64. See, e.g., XIAODONGJIAN ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, STREAMFLOW OF 2007WATER YEAR SUMMARY 3 (2008), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3042/FS-20083042.pdf.
65. Colorado's water districts discussed above have "drawn the line" along seven major river
basins: the South Platte, Arkansas, Rio Grande, Gunnison, Colorado, White/ Yampa, and San
Juan. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-201 (2012).
66. John H. Davidson, Adapting to Clinate Change: Transbasin Water Diversions and an
Example from the Missoui River Valley, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 757, 760 (2010) ("The Missouri
River Basin encompasses ten states, several Canadian provinces, twenty-five Indian tribes, and
nearly the full range of human land uses.").
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pose of establishing Type II watershed districts, and could lead to problems
similar to those under current administrative divisions.
Nevertheless, proponents of IWRM principles believe that they are an
improvement over existing legal structures, and that their implementation is a
goal that governments should work toward." As discussed below, both the
United States and Europe have already made some such attempts, with different degrees of success.
Ill. ATTEMPS TO IMPLEMENT IWRM
Governments resist breaking down existing jurisdictional and administrative barriers and replacing them with geographic ones." Nevertheless, both the
United States and the European Union have attempted to implement water
administration along the lines of IWRM. As discussed below, at this stage, it
seems that the European Union's endeavors to implement IWRM have proven more successful than corresponding attempts in the United States. To predict where the IWRM movement will lead both regions, it is important to examine these efforts and analyze the reasons for their relative success or failure.
A. IWRM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union ("EU") has made a systemic effort to create a unified water resources policy. In 2000, the European Parliament and Council
passed the Water Framework Directive 2000 ("WFD"), summarizing and
implementing these policies."' Fully embracing the principles of IWRM
(though not explicitly endorsing it), the WFD is a directive" towards the EU
member-states, which "requires that all partners in a given river basin manage
their waters in close cooperation, irrespective of administrative borders, according to clear environmental objectives."' Given its ambitious goal of establishing a common framework and implantation process for all member-states,
commentators consider the WFD to be one of the most important pieces of
legislation issued by the EU in the last decade." Conforming to IWRM principles, the WFD requires member-states to describe their geography in terms of
river basins for administrative purposes." The WFD primarily focuses on environmental concerns, as the majority of the legislation relates to improving

67. GLOBAL WATER P'SHIP, supra note 2, at 47-50.
68. See Hooghe & Marks, supranote 42, at 237.
69. Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy, 2000 OJ. (L 327) [hereinafter
WFD].
70. A directive is a legislative act of the European Union which requires member states to
achieve a particular result while at the same time not declaring which means are to be taken to
achieve that result. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 288, 1992 OJ. (C
191).
71.
SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF WATER RESOURCES: AN INTEGRATEi) APPROACH 9
(Carlo Giupponi et al. eds., 2006).

72.

Id. at 47.

73.

WFD, supra note 69, at art. 3.
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water quality and eliminating pollutants." However, it also references integrating water concerns into energy, tourism, transportation, and other areas." Despite this relatively narrow focus, the WFD is a large step forward for IWRM.
The WFD seeks to consolidate the disparate water management systems
of EU member-states to establish coherent regional water policy." It directs
EU countries to create plans and administrative policies to govern water, while
individual member-states remain responsible for implementation." Though
the plans must meet certain broad WFD standards, this method allows for
localized responses to problems, as opposed to EU-directed policies. In order
to provide a legal basis to do so, member-states were to "transpose" the WFD
into their own national law by 2003."
To abide by the "transposal" mandate, member-states must first identify
the watersheds within their borders and assign them into river basin districts."
Nations can consolidate smaller rivers into larger basins at their discretion." If
a watershed crosses international lines (for example, the Danube, which encompasses much of Central Europe"), member-states should work together to
create an international river basin district." However, conflicting national goals
can render such international coordination very difficult. Though the WFD
empowers the European Commission ("Commission") to facilitate efforts of
member-states to reach agreements concerning international watersheds,"
member-states often organized watershed districts according to their own national interest." For example, in Germany, "the main challenge with regard to
the implementation of the WFD was seen in the communication between the
Federal States, especially between the new and the old ones . .. bi-national
contacts with the Czech Republic on the other side were considered as minor."" In situations where watersheds cross EU boundaries, the WFD encourages member-states to cooperate with outside countries, though conflicting
national interests might limit these efforts." Nevertheless, member-states have
made progress with non-EU members by forming bodies such as the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River," wherein even

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at art. 4.
Id.
Id. at art. 3.
Id. at art. 4.
Id. at art. 24.
Id. at art. 3.
Id.
See Philip Weller & Igor Liska, A River Basin ManagementPlanfor the Danube River,
1 WATER RES. & MGMT. 1, 1 (2011).
82. WFD, supra note 69, at art. 5.
83. Id. at art. 12.
84. TUTECH INNOVATION GMBH, THE ROLE OF THE WFD FOR RIVER BASIN PLANNING TO
avilable at
OF
VATERCOURSES
2
(2005),
ACHIEVE
SUSTAINABLE
USE
http://wmy.watersketch.net/VP2_Case_Studies/Gemiany/Hamburg_1Vorkshop_050630/Minut
esWG_1_3_.pdf.
85. Id.
86. WFD, supra note 69, at art. 3.
87. See Weller & Liska, supra note 81, at 1-6.
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states that are not members of the EU have committed to implement WFD
throughout the entire basin.'
After authorities assign watersheds into mutually agreed-upon districts,
member-states (or international river basin districts) must produce River Basin
Management Plans ("RBMPs") for the Commission." RBMPs include goals
and methods for abatement of pollution, comprehensive mapping of waters, a
summary of significant pressures and impacts in a river basin, economic analyses of water use, and a summary of the consultation, process with stakeholders

and the public.' Though the WFD called for member-states to submit the first
of these RBMPs by 2009, many member-states have not yet completed them."
The WFD also instructs river basin authorities to make updated reports every
three years to assess member-states' progress in implementing their respective
national plans, transforning RBMPs from planning into accountability instruments." As Table 1 demonstrates, the WFD has numerous deadlines for
member-states to keep improvement of the continent's waters on track."
2000

Directive entered into force

2003

Transposition in national legislation

2004
2006
2008
2009

Identification of River Basin Districts and Authorities
Characterization of river basin: pressures, impacts, and economic analysis
Establishment of monitoring network
Start public consultation (at the latest)
Present draft river basin management plan to the public
Finalize river basin management plan including program of
measures

2010

Introduce pricing policies

2012
2015

Make operational programs of measures
Meet environmental objectives
First management cycle ends
Second management cycle ends
Third management cycle ends, final deadline for meeting ob-

2021
2027

jectives

Table 1: Thnelbre oflImplementation of WFD An EUMember-States"
88. Id.
89. WFD, supranote 69, at art. 13.
90. Id. at Annex 7.
91. AccompanyingDocument to the Communicationfrom the Commission to the European Parlin2entand the Council 'Toward Sustaihable Water Managementih the European Union,'Fhst Stage in the Implementation of the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC at 21available
at
22,
2007),
final
(Mar.
(2007)
362
22,
SEC
http://ec.europa.eu/environnent/water/water-framework/implrep2007/pdf/
sec_2007_0362_en.pdf [hereinafter 2007 Report].
92. WED, supranote 69, at art. 15.
93. 2007 Report, supra note 91, at 6.
9 4. Id.
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Unfortunately, WFD's implementation has not been as successful as the
Commission. hoped. The drafters of the WFD designed the deadlines to be
realistic, providing member-states with ample time to meet their obligations.'
Yet, just a few years into the implementation period, many member-states fell
short of the timetable and disagreed about the proper implementation course.";
For example, by 2007, the EU member-states of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
and Poland were not cooperating with the non-EU nations of Russia, Belarus,
and the Ukraine concerning attempts to demarcate the proper scale for river
basin administration.
Additionally, before becoming fully legally binding, the WFD directs
member-states to transcribe the WFD mandates into their national legislation,
providing a statutory basis for action on the national level." This transposition
allows member-states to bring laws, regulations, and administrative provisions
into force to comply with the WFD's environmental and regulatory goals."
However, when the Commission conducted its First Implementation Report
in 2007, it revealed "significant and widespread shortcomings in the transposition."'" Though all member-states that had recently joined the EU in 2004 and
2007 transposed the directive as required, most of the "EU15""'countries had
not." Consequently, under the supremacy doctrine in EU law, the Commission launched legal infringement cases against eleven EU countries.' The
Commission submitted five of these cases (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany,
Italy, and Portugal) to the Court of Justice of the European Union, which
ruled against the member-states.0 Further, of the member-states that have
transposed the law, many have done so only partially or in a non-uniform
manner. According to the Commission's assessment, only three countries
(Austria, Malta, and Portugal) possessed satisfactory transpositions such that
the member-states properly made the WFD's goals of environmental protection, public participation, and conferring of rights on the public part of the
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Id at 5.
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101. The "EU15" countries are those that were members of the EU as of Jan. 1, 1995 and
comprise most of Western Europe. See Europe Without
ontici:s, EuRo. UNION,
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103. Id. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Euratom
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member-state's national laws."" Though this data is discouraging, the Commission is considering ways to facilitate a common implementation strategy for
member-states, either bi-laterally with each nonconforming member-state or in
group discussions between EU and implicated nations.""

Figure 1: Nationaland InternationalRiver Basin Disricts
The creation of "administrative regions" creates another problem for the
WFD implementation. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the WTD directs memberstates to submit plans for the creation of various administrative authorities
(based on respective watersheds), called "river basin districts" ("RBDs").."
While all nations have submitted RBDs, there is lack of uniformity as to the
size and scope of the administration of various river basins and sub-basins."'
Therefore, the Commission found many deficiencies in different member105.
2007 Report, supra note 91, at 11.
106. Id. at 13.
107.
The EU Waer Fraimework Dtecive--Integr;atedRiver Basi Management for Europe,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/wate/water-framework/facts-figures/
EURo.
COMM'N,
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states' approaches to river basin district administration.'" The Commission
noted that member-states established one-hundred and -ten RBDs across the
continent."' However, some member-states established one competent authority per river basin district, others established one authority for several districts,
and others established several authorities for one district."' This is in contrast
to the basic IWRM principle that a single Type II structure should aim to
oversee water management within each district."' Further, with regard to international watersheds, the Commission noted differences between memberstates in the ambition, approach, and mechanisms of international commissions."' At the time the Commission issued the 2007 Report, no member-state
had designated an international body as a competent, ministerial authority for
the implementation of the WFD." The multi-jurisdictional problems inherent
in Type I watershed management systems are thus still present, if to a lesser
degree."'
Notwithstanding the aforementioned difficulties, member-states have successfully implemented WFD's international cooperation requirement."'
Member-states have widely accepted the EU's Common Implementation
Strategy ("CIS") for shared planning information exchange among memberstates."' The CIS's main goals are to promote communication between member-states, promote information sharing, develop guidance on technical issues,
inform data management, test and validate pilot river basin programs, and
raise public awareness."' The CIS led to an "inspiring and encouraging" trend
in which member-states and non-member states are working together for the
progressive implementation of the WFD via international bodies." Weighing
the costs and benefits of the WFD, the Commission concluded that, though
the implementation and planning processes are behind, they are conclusively
progressing."' Though member-states have not begun enforcement beyond the
planning stage, the WFD as a guidepost to implementing IWRM is proving
effective, at least at the organization stage." The trend of EU member-states to
cooperate with their neighbors under the guidance of the Commission for the
110.
111.
112.
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purpose of joint watershed management has thus, in the opinion of the Commission, taken a large step towards the realization of IWRM principles in the
EU."
B. IWRM IN THE UNITED STATES

IWRM's notion of organizing water administration along hydrological
boundaries is not a new concept in the United States."' John Wesley Powell
wrote in 1878 that lawmakers should administer water resources (particularly
in the arid Western United States) based on hydrographic basins." In his
mind, river basins in such an administration "would be virtually self-governing
and hence able to negotiate with other similar basins, as well as to control their
own watersheds clear to the drainage divides."" Indeed, authorities in the
United States have repeatedly emphasized basin-wide administration in nearly
every major attempt at river control in the twentieth century.'7 Some of these
projects have been successful, most famously with large-scale projects involving
dam construction, electricity production, and flood control, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority.'" Nevertheless, over the course of the twentieth century, the United States has rejected broad reorganization of water entities along
watershed lines, instead favoring piecemeal litigation'" and interstate compacts."
The history of attempts at river basin-wide management in the United
States spans several eras. Each era represents a grafting of new strategies and
practices onto the practices of previous eras."' During the New Deal Era, the
federal government actively constructed large public works.' The national
government spent funds on numerous projects designed for the improvement
of navigation, providing water for irrigation, flood control, and hydroelectric
power."' These projects were located on the main stems of rivers, with little
focus on tributaries."' Consequently, the government did not create plans for
comprehensive river basin development and made no attempt to organize
watershed-level administration." Thus, during subsequent decades, the government felt "concern about the need for more comprehensive planning" in
123.
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water resources.'" This concern led Congress to pass the Water Resources
Planning Act of 1965,"' which encouraged state, local, and regional governments to work together for integrated water resource management." However,
the Act had little long-term effect." Its language was primarily limited to upcoming governmental projects, not overall water administration." Further, it
was ineffective even in regard to those ventures, as the government had already
authorized many large-scale projects, and "proponent states had enough political clout to move them through Congress.""'
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the federal government largely removed
itself from large-scale involvement in water planning."' As a result, in recent
decades, many state and local interests filled the void." These local and regional citizen groups are now stakeholders in most water disputes."' There are
as many as six hundred citizen groups in the country that include water-related
affairs among their main missions.'" These groups are typically publicconsensus-based citizen groups with particularized agendas."' For example, a
concerned-citizen group may be dedicated to the preservation of the habitat of
certain fish in a stream or it may be a landowners' association opposed to the
construction of a specific darn."' Given the narrow focus of these ad hoc responses, most eschew any watershed planning on the scale of IWRM."
Because IWRM focuses on multiple water-related issues on a relatively
large scale (typically the watershed), a concerned-citizen group that is only interested in one or two issues on a small stretch of river is largely detached from
watershed-management principles." Further, given IWRM's focus on administrative structures, the lack of government involvement (particularly the federal
government, when dealing with watersheds covering multiple states) indicates
IWRM is at odds with the current political climate in the United States. Similarly, though in recent decades Congress proposed some measures to manage
large drainage basins on a hydrological basis, "with few exceptions, the states
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and local water users successfully opposed these efforts."" Consequently, with
the contemporary focus on local interests, there is currently no nationwide
WFD-style watershed management program in the United States." However,
compacts between states demonstrate that such planning is nevertheless possible.
US states have entered into twenty-six different water apportionment
compacts, most over fifty years ago.' Interstate water compacts are, essentially,
constitutions for water-states concede some control over their water (for example, they must regulate citizens' diversions to meet requirements of cornpact, not to meet requirements of state water laws), and the compact becomes
both state and federal law.'" Though congressional consent is required to approve interstate compacts," the process offers flexibility for states to both work
together and pursue local interests."' Such attention to particularized regional
problems might not be available by distant congressional action (in the mode
of a WFD-style "top-down" directive) or judicial decree."' Disputes between
states over water often concern matters of allocation, and most compacts address this problem."' But a few interstate compacts also allow for joint management of a watershed along the lines of IWRM.
Following numerous disputes before the United States Supreme Court,"
the states of Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania formed the
Delaware River Basin Compact in 196 1.'" Unlike previous interstate compacts,
which focused exclusively on allocation between states," the Delaware River
Basin Compact charges the Delaware River Commission, which governs the
Delaware River Basin in multiple states (see Figure 2.0), with creating comprehensive plans over the watershed."'
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Figure 2: DelawareRiver Basin tith County Boundauic
Because the Delaware River Commission has considerable managerial authority over governing water quality, allocation, usage, and river prpjects, the
Delaware River Basin Compact is akin to the WFD." Like the river basin
districts of the WFD, the Delaware River Commission works with state governments to equitably distribute the river's resources.'" Further, by involving
the federal government, "national concerns may be aired, obviating the need
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for Congressional statutory preemption."" Such managerial authority vested
jointly in these parties is precisely the sort of Type II governmental structure
envisioned by IWRM, and the Delaware River Basin Compact is proof that
the United States' constitutional framework is capable of supporting watershed-based water management schemes.'"
Given the success of the Delaware River Commission, the Delaware River
Basin Compact should be a model for future interstate agreements in the
United States."' While Congress has not yet attempted to implement a WFDstyle approach to watershed administration, interstate compacts could go a
long way toward achieving the same end. Other states have begun to work
together to establish river commissions with broad regulatory powers, and a
group of experts created a "Model Compact" as a guideline for future cooperation."' Such agreements are attractive to states, given the flexibility of joint
regulatory entities combined with the absence of sacrifice of state sovereignty
to the federal government."" Thus, it seems that the modern trend in United
States interstate water compacts is toward the establishment of a joint managerial authority similar to the Delaware River Basin Compact."' However, as with
all interstate compacts, progress remains slow, and the IWRM-derived goal of
nationwide comprehensive watershed management remains a distant goal in
the United States.'"
IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EU AND THE UNITED STATES
IN IMPLEMENTING WATERSHED DISTRICT MANAGEMENT
The European Union successfully issued broad legislation from a centralized government forcing member-states to work together to implement IWRM
principles."' Conversely, the United States has favored localized initiatives,
causing watershed management (if present at all) to be based upon interstate
compacts.' 2 The question is, therefore, should the United States continue on
its state-centered approach to establishing IWRM, or should the federal government act to bring about a nationwide system on par with the WFD in the
European Union.
Many commentators agree that, "unless overriding national interests dictate otherwise, watershed management should be a flexible, responsive, 'bottom-up' consensus-building process rather than a universal, standardized, 'top165. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE DISPuTES: THE SUPREME CoUlrv's ORIGINAL
JURIsDIciON 167 (2006) (quoting Joseph Girardot, Tonard a Rational Scheme of Intenstate
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down' product."'. Practically speaking, it seems Congressional will to enact
WFD-level legislation for national watershed management is lacking. Elected
representatives introduced few such ambitious watershed bills in Congress, but
those died quickly."' Similarly, the US Supreme Court avoids interfering in
state water law and allocation when it can, as it instead encourages states to
enter into interstate compacts.7 ' Realistically, it seems that a WFD-style "topdown" directive is not forthcoming in the United States, though this does not
foreclose the possibility that it could happen.
The EU government is not necessarily better positioned to issue "topdown" directives than is the US government. Twin rulings by the European
Court of justice firmly established the supremacy of EU law over memberstates and eliminated questions as to whether the European Commission is
empowered to enact the WFD.'" Though the pace of transposition is slow, the
mere fact that some member-states implemented the WFD as national law
contributes to its validity and likely success. But similarly, in the United States
the Supreme Court has upheld congressional power to regulate water under
the commerce'"7 and property'" clauses, as well as the spending' and defense
powers." This demonstrates that, notwithstanding federalism concerns, Congress is not constitutionally prohibited from implementing at least some degree
of watershed management on the national level.'"' In instances where federal
authority conflicts with states, the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution
overrides state opposition.'"' The question then becomes in what fields Congress intended to preempt state law in implementing an administrative scheme
over water matters.'" The courts could allow some degree of preemption of
state regulation, but might be less receptive to schemes that are not sufficiently
focused."'
Because watershed-based regulation will affect multiple states' regulatory
schemes, the validity of a federally-created administrative system depends upon its subject matter. For example, a scheme that confines itself to the environmental protection of waters is constitutional.'" But because water matters
involve a variety of distinct fields (for example, agriculture, land use, mining,
173.
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recreation, and others), it should be noted there are many water-related areas
where Congress has never attempted to regulate.'" Were Congress to attempt
such a wide-ranging scheme, it could raise serious concerns affecting state and
individual rights and could place the federal government in control of regulation fornerly in states' hands.'" For the time being, the question of whether

Congress could preempt the entirety of water management is an open one,
because Congress has thus far chosen not to regulate certain areas that are
nevertheless affected by water decisions."

V. CONCLUSION
Because states' rights might limit congressional power, interstate compacts
are the most promising method by which to implement [WRM-related policies in the United States. Nevertheless, it seems that a top-down, WFD-style
approach would be a faster means of bringing about the same result, though
implementation in the EU has had certain problems. The compacts-based
process that is dominant in the United States and the EU's top-down directives
are examples of the differences that exist between the regions' respective approaches to government. The progressions of the EU toward concentrated
central government and of the United States toward localized concerns might
be demonstrations of inherent cultural and political differences between the
two regions. But it is clear IWRM, which this Comment argues will be necessarv to solve water-related problems in the future, shows promise in both areas.
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